This section delves into the etymology, philosophical understanding, moral evaluation, and the relationship with rational cognition of the complex emotion "pity." The term "pity" originates from the Latin pietas, originally referring to reverence for gods, ancestors, and kin, later evolving to mean sympathy, but in modern times, it has also acquired connotations of arrogance and contempt. Philosophers have disagreed on the nature and morality of pity, with debates centering on whether pity implies sharing another's suffering, suggests a status difference, or stems from fear or a sense of superiority. Furthermore, expressions and understandings of pity vary across languages, such as "pity," "compassion," and "sympathy" in English, and "Mitleid" and "Sympathie" in German. The ambiguity and historicity of these terms provide space for theoretical interpretation.

In terms of moral evaluation, pity is often regarded as a virtue, but in the history of Western philosophy, it has frequently been criticized for disturbing the mind. Plato believed that pity weakens an individual's independence and autonomy, while Seneca viewed it as a moral sickness. Nietzsche considered pity a sign of weakness, emphasizing that it implies contempt. Rationalist philosophers like Spinoza and Kant also criticized the emotional nature of pity, arguing that it opposes reason and lacks moral normativity.

However, Aristotle's definition of pity in Rhetoric emphasizes its cognitive aspect, suggesting that pity is not an instinctual or blind emotion but is based on the cognition of others' suffering and the judgment that one might suffer similarly. This cognitive characteristic allows pity to enter the realm of ancient jurisprudence, becoming part of fair judgment. Enlightenment philosophers of the 18th century, such as Rousseau, regarded pity as a natural moral sentiment and the source of social virtues, highlighting its biological and pre-rational features while also noting that its arousal requires cognitive and reflective engagement. Rousseau's view of sympathy transcended the level of psychological description, taking on a metaphysical color and emphasizing the role of pity in the process of individual subjectification.

Influenced by Rousseau, Schopenhauer believed that the identity manifested in pity is not limited to human life but exists in all things, including animals and nature. Scottish Enlightenment philosophers Hume and Smith inherited Aristotle's view of pity and expanded the concept of sympathy, considering it a psychological phenomenon that enables emotional communication, with its mechanism operating through the transformation of ideas into impressions. The perspectives of these philosophers collectively constitute a multidimensional understanding and evaluation of the emotion of pity, revealing its complexity at moral, cognitive, and emotional levels.

Conclusion

This section explores the cultural differences and evolution of pity in Chinese and Western philosophical traditions. In ancient Chinese, pity was a positive emotion, with Mencius regarding it as the starting point of moral practice. In Western philosophy, pity has often been subject to moral suspicion, although some philosophers have attempted to base morality on it. The emergence of phenomenology brought changes to the concept of pity, with French phenomenology ultimately making it synonymous with love, endowing it with the potential to serve as a foundation for postmodern ethics and enabling dialogue with Chinese culture.